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Comments
OTHER-THAN-HONORABLE MILITARY
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGES: TIME FOR
CONFRONTATIONt
This Comment examines the military's current procedure for
discharging servicemembers and imposing undesirable, other-than-
honorable service characterizations on their service records. The
Comment concludes that due to the potential for erroneous impo-
sition of damaging other-than-honorable service characterizations,
the process of handling such discharges should be made procedur-
ally more careful. It is suggested that either additional due pro-
cess rights be grafted onto the current administrative discharge
system, or that the other-than-honorable discharge process be
placed in the hands of the military court-martial system.
INTRODUCTION
About 400,000 men and women enter the military services each
year. Most return to civilian life after a single tour of duty or less."
The military is a specialized society separate from the civilian soci-
ety - with unique laws and traditions developed during its long his-
tory.2 The primary business of the armed forces is to fight, or be
ready to fight, wars.3 To prepare for and perform its vital role, the
military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life.4 The laws and traditions governing that
t The author wishes to acknowledge Linda Fort, Gary Klueck, Jeffrey Laveson,
and Hal Mosher, students at the University of San Diego Law School, for their
invaluable editorial contributions. Thanks Mom and Dad.
1. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, MILITARY DISCHARGE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES RESULT IN WIDE DISPARITIES: CONGRESSIONAL REvIEW IS
NEEDED (1980). In 1981, 530,718 people were discharged from the services. U.S. Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83, 362
(103d edition) Washington, D.C., 1982.
2. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 743 (1974).
3. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
4. "The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate disci-
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discipline have a long history and they were inspired by military exi-
gencies. These exigencies are as powerful now as in the past.5 This
legacy of duty and discipline is responsible for the military's policy
of administratively discharging individuals who are either unfit or
unsuitable for military service.8
Most decisions regarding the composition, training, equipping, and
control of the armed forces are beyond judicial review.7 Ultimate
responsibility for these decisions is vested by the Constitution exclu-
sively in the legislative and executive branches." The courts have tra-
ditionally acknowledged their incompetence in the area of military
affairs.9 The traditional position regarding review of military deci-
sions was stated by the Supreme Court in Reaves v. Ainsworth.10
The Reaves Court held that decisions of military tribunals, acting
within the scope of their lawful powers, could not be reviewed or set
aside by the courts.1" Judges were not then and are not now given
the task of running the army.1 2 Therefore, the courts are reluctant to
pline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as
scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupu-
lous not to intervene in judicial matters." Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
5. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975). The servicemember who
does not conform to required standards of duty and discipline burdens the service in
terms of cost, administrative efforts, degradation of morale, and substandard mission per-
formance. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
6. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3 (a)(1) (1983). "Unfitness" applies to individuals showing pat-
terns of shirking, drug abuse, sexual perversion, unsanitary habits, failure to pay just
debts, or failure to support dependents. "Unsuitability" connotes inaptitude for military
service. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, paras. VII-G, I (October 1, 1982),
[hereinafter cited as DoD Directive].
7. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953); accord, benShalom v. Secretary
of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 970 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
8. Congress has power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. "It would be difficult to think
of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Consti-
tution to be left to the political branches directly responsible - as the judiciary is not
to the electoral process." Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
9. The Supreme Court in Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973), stated:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the
courts have less competence. The complex, subtle and professional decisions as
to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essen-
tially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these deci-
sions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodi-
cally subject to electoral accountability. It is this power of oversight and control
of military force by elected representatives and officials which underlies our en-
tire constitutional system ... [emphasis in original].
Accord, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981).
10. 219 U.S. 296 (1911).
11. Id. at 304. The Reaves Court asserted, "To those in the military or naval ser-
vice of the United States the military law is due process." Id. at 304.
12. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953). Recently, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal rested on this Orloff principle in upholding the military's right to dis-
charge homosexual servicemembers. Watkins v. United States Army, 721 F.2d 687 (9th
Cir. 1983). As Chief Justice Earl Warren stated, "Courts are ill-equipped to determine
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interfere with the military's exercise of discretion over its internal
affairs. This reluctance is particularly apparent when the military
makes personnel changes, pursuant to its regulations, through its
promotion or discharge procedures. 13 Yet, "Restricted judicial re-
view is not ... the equivalent of no judicial review. Courts will re-
view, without hesitation, cases in which it is alleged that the military
violated the Constitution, applicable statutes, or its own
regulations.'
One military decision that has been receiving increasing judicial
attention is the military administrative discharge decision. 15 Courts
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might
have." Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187
(1962). But cf. Vaice v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (upholding
the validity of Air Force personnel weight regulations against an equal protection
attack):
[T]he court is not overly impressed with the Air Force's attempt to drape
itself in bunting and dust off Orloff v. Willoughby [citation omitted] [supra
note 12]. The desire of the judiciary to avoid entanglement in military adminis-
tration is strong, but no court today can avoid reasoned analysis of a serious
constitutional claim under the catchphrase that judges do not run the army.
Rather than summarily consign a particular complaint to the realm of inter-
nal military affairs, a court must balance the special needs of the military
against the constitutional rights of the individual, keeping always in mind that
constitutional claims are themselves unequal in the whole scale of values.
Id. at 833. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 89 (1980),
stated:
[E]ven in the area of military affairs, deference to congressional judgments can-
not be allowed to shade into an abdication of this Court's ultimate responsibility
to decide constitutional questions. As the Court has pointed out: "[T]he phrase
'war power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any exer-
cise of congressional power which can be brought within its ambit. '[E]ven the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties.'
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-264 (1967), quoting Home Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
13. Dilley v. Alexander, 603 F.2d 914, 919-20 (D.C. Cir. 1979); accord, Pauls v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 457 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1972). "There is a strong, but rebut-
table, presumption that military administrators discharge their duties correctly, lawfully,
and in good faith." Kalista v. Secretary of the Navy, 560 F. Supp. 608, 615 (D. Colo.
1983).
14. ben Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F.Supp. 964, 971 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
accord, Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1971). In an exhaustive review
of the case law, the court in Arnheiter v. Ignatius, 292 F. Supp. 911, 920 (N.D. Cal.
1968), affd, 435 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1970), concluded that:
The Supreme Court is prepared to relax the traditional non-reviewability rule
sufficiently to admit ultimate, collateral federal court review of claims by mili-
tary personnel of denial of constitutional due process in such matters as court
martial convictions which involve life, liberty or other penalty, and administra-
tive discharges from the services which involve their quasi property rights.
15. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) established the reviewability of mili-
are willing to scrutinize how the decision to separate a ser-
vicemember prior to the normal expiration of his enlistment is
reached, especially when the military decides to characterize the ser-
vicemember's discharge as under other-than-honorable conditions.,,
A discharge characterized or graded as other-than-honorable stigma-
tizes its recipient17 and deprives him of substantial veterans' benefits
normally incident to service characterized as honorable; this causes
other harms as well, without affording the servicemember the due
process protections of a court-martial."8 This Comment examines the
military's adminisirative discharge process, and suggests that better
protection of servicemembers' due process rights is required when
the military issues other-than-honorable discharges. Courts have as-
serted that the Constitution provides servicemembers protection from
arbitrary or unfair administrative discharges.19 However, the con-
tours of due process in the military community are far from clear.20
Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains,
what process is due?21
tary administrative discharges. The Department of Defense defines a discharge as "com-
plete severance from all military status." Separation is "a general term which includes
discharge and release from active duty." Administrative Separation is a "discharge or
release from active duty upon expiration of enlistment or required period of service, or
prior thereto, in the manner prescribed by [this directive] or by law, but specifically
excluding separation by sentence of general or special court-martial." DoD Directive,
supra note 6, at para. IV.
16. The term "characterization" refers to the label or grade given one's record of
service, e.g. honorable, general, other-than-honorable, dishonorable, or bad conduct.
"The purpose of a discharge certificate is to record the separation of an individual from
the military service and to specify the character of service rendered during the period
covered by the discharge." Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 583 (1958) (quoting Army
Regulation 615-375, para. 2(b)). More modern regulations provide:
Characterization of service at separation shall be based upon the quality of the
member's service [which] shall be determined in accordance with standards of
acceptable personal conduct and performance of duty for naval personnel. These
standards are found in the UCMJ, directives and regulations issued by the De-
partment of Defense and [the Navy], the Enlisted Performance Evaluation Sys-
tem, and the time-honored customs and traditions of the naval service.
Naval Military Personnel Manual § 3610300(2)(a) (changes complete through October,
1983) [hereinafter cited as NAVMILPERSMAN].
17. Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see infra note 53 and
accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
20. Correa v. Clayton, 563 F.2d 396, 399 (9th Cir. 1977). Regulations provide
that discharge board proceedings "should be formalized to the extent of assuring full
opportunity for presentation of the respondent's case." 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(d)(2)(1983).
This Comment partly concerns the meaning of that phrase. See infra note 94.
21. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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Background
The use of less than fully honorable discharges began about
1890.22 There was no historical precedent for such discharges and to
date it is doubtful whether statutory authority exists for issuing
them.2 3 Less than honorable discharges were called "blue" dis-
charges until 1947, when the "general" and "undesirable" designa-
tions appeared. Since that time, approximately one million general
and undesirable discharges have been issued. 4
Administrative discharge procedure is governed by regulations, di-
rectives, and orders handed down by Congress and the military de-
partments. 5 Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, first issued
in 1965, is the modern source of discharge procedure law.26 Much
discretion is given the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy
to promulgate orders governing discharge procedure within Depart-
ment of Defense guidelines.
There are two steps to a separation, whether separation is by
court-martial or by administrative means. The first step is deciding
whether to separate the servicemember, and the second is selecting
the type of discharge to give him: that is, determining what charac-
terization is appropriate for his service record. 8
Both of these decisions may be made without an administrative
board hearing if an honorable or general discharge is to be
22. D. ADDLESTONE AND S. HEWMAN, ACLU PRACTICE MANUAL ON MILITARY
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCHARGE UPGRADING 6 (1975).
23. See Comment, Punishment of Enlisted Personnel Outside the UCMJ A Stat-
utory and Equal Protection Analysis of Military Discharge Certificates, 9 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 227 (1974).
24. D. ADDLESTONE AND S. HEWMAN, supra note 22, at 6. During approximately
the same period, from 1950 to 1980, about 21 million people were separated from the
military. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 1.
25. Authority for administrative discharges derives from 10 U.S.C. § 1169 (1982),
which provides:
No regular enlisted member of an armed force may be discharged before his
term of service expires, except -
(1) as prescribed by the Secretary concerned;
(2) by sentence of a general or special court-martial; or
(3) as otherwise provided by law.
26. DoD Directive, supra note 6. See 32 C.F.R. § 41 et seq (1983).
27. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall prescribe implementing
documents to ensure that the policies, standards, and procedures set forth in this part are
administered in a manner that provides consistency in separation policy to the extent
practicable in a system that is based on command discretion. 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(a) (1983)
(emphasis in original). This delegation is recognized by Congress in 10 U.S.C. § 1169
(1) (1982), supra note 25.
28. DoD Directive, supra note 6, at para. IX (B). 32 C.F.R. § 41.1, App. A, Part
3 (1983).
awarded.2" However, an other-than-honorable discharge may only be
given if the servicemember has been afforded the opportunity to have
an administrative board hearing.30 The board serves three functions
for the member facing an other-than-honorable discharge. First, it
acts as a fact finder and determines whether the servicemember did
the acts for which he is being discharged.3 1 Next, the board recom-
mends whether the member should be separated or retained.3 2 Fi-
nally, if the decision is to separate, the board recommends a dis-
charge characterization.3"
If one is separated pursuant to a court-martial, only a bad conduct
or a dishonorable discharge may be imposed.34 Bad conduct and dis-
honorable discharges may not be given administratively.3 5 They are
forms of punishment and, compared to other-than-honorable dis-
charges, they are relatively rarely given.36 The other three types of
discharge - honorable, general (under honorable conditions), and
undesireable (under other-than-honorable conditions) - are granted
administratively.37 An honorable discharge is awarded when the ser-
vicemember's record demonstrates proper military behavior and pro-
ficient performance of duty.38 General or undesirable discharges may
be imposed when honorable discharge standards are not met.39
Grounds for granting general or undesirable discharges include unfit-
29. Keef v. United States, 185 Ct. CL. 454, 467 (1968). However, if a ser-
vicemember has been in the service for more than six years, he may request a Board.
NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, at § 3640300 (1)(a)(1).
30. 32 C.F.R. § 730.1(d)(3) (1983). Navy and Marine Corps regulations are used
in this Comment as examples. Discharge regulations are generally uniform throughout
the services. See supra note 27. An administrative discharge board is a "board appointed
to render findings based on facts obtaining, or believed to obtain, in a case and to recom-
mend retention in the service, separation, or suspension of separation, and the reason for
separation and the characterization of service or description of separation."
NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, at § 3610200 (1)(a).
31. 32 C.F.R. § 41.6, App A, Part 3 (c)(5)(g)(1),(2) (1983).
32. Id. at Part 3(C)(5)(g)(3),(4).
33. Id. at Part 3(C)(5)(g)(4)(c).
34. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, paras. 76a(3),(4), 127c (rev.
ed. 1969).
35. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(d),(e). A bad conduct discharge may be imposed by a spe-
cial or general court-martial; a dishonorable discharge may only be given by a general
court-martial. Id.
36. 32 C.F.R. § 724.111 (1983). In 1981, 90.8% of all discharges were honorable;
5.2% were general; 4.1% were other-than-honorable. Out of 530,718 discharges, only
4,020 were bad conduct or dishonorable. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1.
37. 32 C.F.R. § 724.109 (1983).
38. DoD Directive, supra note 6, para. VI (A). 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(a)(1983).
39. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(b),(c) (1983). Distinguishing between general and undesir-
able discharges may be artificial. "Discharge with anything less than a record of honora-
ble service constitutes a stigma of tremendous impact which will have a lifelong effect.
This Court does not see any substantial distinction between an undesirable discharge and
a General Discharge . . . ." Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714, 714 (N.D. Cal.
1965). See also infra note 50.
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ness, misconduct, and security reasons.4"
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The Department of Defense has attempted to clearly state its pol-
icy reasons for its discharge procedure.41 Adopted by the various
branches of the service, this policy emphasizes that being a member
of the military is a calling different from any civilian occupation. 2
For example, the Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual
states: "Becoming a Marine involves a commitment to the United
States, to the Marine Corps, and to one's fellow citizens and fellow
Marines that one will complete successfully a period of obligated ser-
vice. Failure to meet required standards of performance or discipline
violates that commitment. 43 Members violating this commitment
should be separated quickly to avoid the high cost of pay, adminis-
trative efforts, degradation of morale, and substandard mission per-
formance that is associated with retention of servicemembers who do
not conform to required standards of discipline and performance.4
The executives of the armed forces have the authority to discharge
40. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(c) (1983). Other reasons for general or undesirable charac-
terization include unsatisfactory performance, drug abuse, drug or alcohol abuse rehabil-
itation failure, separation in lieu of trial by court-martial, unsatisfactory participation
in the ready reserve, and separation in the best interest of the service.
NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, §§ 3630300-3630900. Often, the difference be-
tween receipt of an honorable and general, or between a general and undesirable dis-
charge depends on a member's performance and conduct marks on the enlisted perform-
ance evaluation system. If a member's performance and conduct marks, on a final
average, fall below 2.8, or show a trait average for military behavior below 3.0, an other-
wise honorable discharge becomes general. NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, §
3610300(3)(b). See infra notes 99-113.
41. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(a) (1983) provides:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to promote the readiness of the
Military Services by maintaining high standards of conduct and performance.
Separation policy promotes the readiness of the Military Services by providing
an orderly means to:
(1) Ensure that the Military Services are served by individuals capable of
meeting required standards of duty performance and discipline;
(2) Maintain standards of performance and conduct through characterization
of service in a system that emphasizes the importance of honorable service;
(3) Achieve authorized force levels and grade distributions; and
(4) Provide for the orderly administrative separation of enlisted personnel in a
variety of circumstances.
42. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(b) (1983). NAVMILPERSMAN § 3610100(3)(b).
43. Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual, para. 6101.
NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, § 3610100(3)(b)(1).
44. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(b)(3) (1983). NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, §
3610200(3).
servicemembers prior to the end of their enlistments.45 There appear
good policy reasons, such as cost avoidance, for this rule.46 However,
scant policy supports the derogatory characterization of an individ-
ual's service. It would seem better to merely separate burdensome
military personnel expeditiously,47 in furtherance of the Defense De-
partment policy mentioned above, with an uncharacterized
discharge.48
Nevertheless, the services have been characterizing discharges for
almost 100 years.49 Advocates of characterization stress that charac-
terizing discharges distinguishes honorable performance. If everyone
received an honorable, or a neutrally-characterized discharge, the
honor and pride of the recipient who strives for and earns an honora-
ble discharge would be lessened. 0 Also, arguably, the recipients of
undesirable discharges have brought their plight upon themselves.51
Whatever justification is cited, the type of discharge issued serves as
a judgment upon the quality of service rendered by the dischargee. 52
These justifications for characterization should be weighed against
45. "The Armed Forces have the right and the duty to separate from the service
with an appropriately characterized discharge certificate members who clearly demon-
strate that they are unqualified for retention." DoD Directive, supra note 6, para. V (A).
As the court stated in Kalista v. Secretary of the Navy, 560 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Colo.
1983):
A serviceman does not have a contractual right to remain in the service until
the expiration of his enlistment term. However, an administrative discharge is-
sued prior to the expiration of the enlistment term is void if it exceeds applicable
statutory authority, or ignores pertinent procedural regulations or violates mini-
mum concepts of basic fairness.
Accord, Waller v. United States, 461 F.2d 1273, 1276 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
46. See supra notes 41 and 44 and accompanying text.
47. Processing time goals for administrative separations are outlined by
NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, at § 3610100(8).
48. Uncharacterized discharges are already provided for in cases of entry level sep-
aration and for orders for release from the custody and control of the armed forces be-
cause of void enlistment or induction. NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, §
3610300(1)(c).
49. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
50. To Limit the Separation of Members of the Armed Forces Under Other Than
Honorable Conditions: Hearings on H.R. 523 (H.R. 10422) To Amend Title 10, United
States Code Before the Subcomm. No. 3, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 5825, 5866 (1971)
(statement of Major General Leo Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Military Personnel Policy) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings]. But cf. the statement of
the court in Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 853 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1961): "Since about
90% of all discharges issued are honorable, a discharge of that type is commonly re-
garded as indicating acceptable, rather than exemplary service. In consequence, anything
less than an honorable discharge is viewed as derogatory, and inevitably stigmatizes the
recipient." See also supra note 36.
51. "Conditions within the service are ... designed to produce an honorable dis-
charge, and a soldier who fails or is unable or unwilling, to abide by the regulations of
the service and its traditions and social code, has placed himself in jeopardy." 1971
Hearings, supra note 50, at 5917 (statement of Colonel William Weber).
52. Bland v. Connally, supra note 50, at 853 n.1. See Harmon v. Brucker, supra
note 16 (discussion concerning various discharges and reasons for granting them) and
supra note 40, discussion concerning performance evaluations.
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the harm characterization inflicts. It is also arguable however that
the equitable balance weighs in favor of discontinuing the practice,
even after 100 years.
THE PROBLEM WITH CHARACTERIZATION
The undesirable discharge certificate symbolizes much more than
merely separation from the service. "There can be no doubt that a
military discharge on other-than-honorable grounds is punitive in na-
ture, since it stigmatizes the serviceman's reputation, impedes his
ability to gain employment and is in life, if not in law, prima facie
evidence against-the serviceman's character, patriotism or loyalty."153
Only a court-martial, however, is authorized to impose punitive dis-
charges.54 Derogatory characterization of administrative separations
is not an authorized means for imposing punishment in the military
law system. 55
Among the punitive results of an other-than-honorable discharge
is a preclusion of reenlistment in any of the services,5 6 and restriction
of opportunities in other government and private employment.5 This
penalty arguably infringes on the servicemember's liberty interests
protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment."' The
53. Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). An undesirable dis-
charge "is worse than a bad conduct discharge, as far as its implications are concerned,
and the results are also quite severe. . . I think it is a very severe penalty." 1971 Hear-
ings, supra note 50, at 5825 (testimony of Chief Judge Quinn of the Court of Military
Appeals). "In terms of its effects on reputation, the stigma experienced by the recipient
of a discharge under other than honorable conditions is very akin to the concept of in-
famy . . . ." Everett, Military Administrative Discharges - The Pendulum Swings,
1966 DUKE L.J. 41, 50.
54. Grant v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 600, 609 (1963).
55. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(d),(e) (1983). "So long as an administrative discharge is not
used as a summary guise for punitive action, [citation omitted] . . . the military remains
within legally proper bounds when it chooses to grant an honorable discharge for the
Government's convenience." Birt v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 910, 913-14 (1967). See
generally Comment, Punishment of Enlisted Personnel Outside the UCMJ, supra note
23; Comment, Nonjudicial Punishment Under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice: Congressional Precept and Military Practice, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839
(1982).
56. 32 C.F.R. § 730.16(0 (1983); NAVMILPERSMAN, supra note 16, §
3620100(b).
57. To decide whether a state (the government) must afford procedural protections
against arbitrary state action, the threshold question is whether a property or liberty
interest protected by 5th and 4th amendments is at stake. Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. 397, aff'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). Here, the serviceman's liberty interest is in
being free from the stigma of an undesireable discharge. Such a stigma often directly
restricts his opportunities in civilian and other government employment.
58. Giles v. Secretary of the Army, 475 F. Supp. 595, 598 (D.D.C. 1979). "Job
application forms almost universally require a statement as to military service and the
Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth59 described a two-prong
liberty-interest test for determining whether due process protects an
individual facing termination of his employment. The first prong in-
volves harm to one's reputation; the second concerns harm to one's
future employment opportunities. The Court stated that when a per-
son's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because
of what the government is doing to him, due process applies to pro-
tect him.60 Furthermore, governmental action that forecloses a range
of employment opportunities also deprives the affected person of a
liberty interest, thereby invoking due process. "[T]o be deprived not
only of present government employment but of future opportunity
for it certainly is no small injury.""1 Thus, the court in Rew v.
Ward 2 stated that because the government would likely communi-
cate derogatory information to possible future employers, the airman
being discharged had a liberty interest in continued service in the
Air Force protected by the fifth amendment.13 The military recog-
nizes the potential for harm to one's civilian future and provides pe-
riodic counseling to warn servicemembers of the likelihood of re-
stricted employment opportunities should they receive an undesirable
discharge.64
type of discharge received; since about ninety per cent [sic] of the discharges issued are
honorable, disclosure of discharge in any other form is ordinarily certain to produce fur-
ther inquiry with predictable results." Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 858 n.10 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
59. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
60. Id. at 573 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)). But cf
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (mere injury to reputation does not fall within consti-
tutionally protected liberty).
61. Roth, supra note 59, at 574 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The Roth Court further
elaborated on what the "liberty" guarantee of the Due Process Clause entails:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty...
guaranteed . . . the term has received much consideration and some of the in-
cluded things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally those privileges long recognized
• . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added)).
62. 402 F. Supp. 331 (D.N.M. 1975).
63. Id. at 340. Another court stated: "It can be argued that officers and service-
men, upon termination df their service, have a quasi property right to have their dis-
charges properly reflect their military record because if such discharges improperly and
adversely reflect the military record they might stigmatize the dischargee and adversely
affect his civilian future." Arnheiter v. Ignatius, 292 F. Supp. 911, 920 (N.D. Cal.
1968), affid, 435 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1970).
64. 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(a)(2) (1983); Marine Corps Separation and Retirement
Manual para. 6103. Navy personnel being processed for an other-than-honorable dis-
charge sign a "statement of awareness" which states, in part:
I understand that if such discharge is under Other Than Honorable Condi-
tions, it may deprive me of virtually all veterans' benefits based upon my current
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Another punitive effect of receiving an other-than-honorable dis-
charge is ineligibility for substantial veterans' benefits.6 5 This loss is
particularly onerous because servicemembers are recruited and enlist
with the expectation of receiving these benefits as a part of their
compensation. Also, if the servicemember is a candidate for natural-
ized citizenship, receipt of an undesirable discharge is likely to cause
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to deny his citizenship
application. 6
Being separated from the service before one's term of enlistment
expires is itself a stigma. Almost all employers require job applicants
to state whether they served in the military, and if so, how long.
From this information, an employer can tell whether the applicant
completed a full term of enlistment. If the employer perceives that
the applicant did not, the employer may assume the applicant was
discharged early. The general assumption is good employees are not
fired. Therefore, early separation itself stigmatizes a servicemember.
Derogatory characterization is an added stigma. 67
period of active service, and that I may expect to encounter substantial
prejudice in civilian life in situations wherein the type of service rendered in any
branch of the Armed Forces or the character of discharge received therefrom
may have a bearing.
"Failure on the part of the member to receive or to understand such explanation [the
periodic counselling] does not create a bar to separation or characterization." 32 C.F.R.
§ 41.4(a)(2) (1983).
65. 39 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1982); CAL. MIL. & VEr. CODE § 980 (West 1983).
Some states distinguish between honorable and general discharge ratings in providing
veterans' benefits. See e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.203(a) (Vernon 1972 & Supp.
1977) (exempting only honorably discharged veterans from tuition and fees at state insti-
tutions of higher education); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4413 (31) (Vernon 1976) (pro-
viding employment preferences only to honorably discharged veterans). As Judge
Bazelon stated in Roelofs v. Secretary of the Air Force, 628 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
"the injury from a less-than-Honorable [sic] discharge is often entirely independent of
the underlying reason for the derogatory characterization." Id. at 603 (Bazelon, S.C.J.,
concurring), citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4413 (31) (Vernon 1976) (veterans bene-
fits denied regardless of reason for less-than-honorable discharge).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1439 (1982).
67. In Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961), an inactive reservist was
given an undesirable discharge for alleged subversive conduct engaged in while he was in
inactive status. The district court assumed the Navy's right to separate any member for
any cause and without a hearing through a non-derogatory, honorable discharge, but
stated: "What is challenged is the right of the service to introduce the element of punish-
ment or 'labeling' into the involuntary separation, by characterizing the discharge derog-
atorily." Id. at 858. See generally Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A
Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973).
CURRENT DUE PROCESS
Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 outlines the rules to be
followed in effecting adminstrative separations. 8 The Marine Corps
Separation and Retirement Manual incorporates these procedures,
expansively enumerating the rights currently afforded a Marine be-
ing processed for an other-than-honorable discharge:
The member shall be notified in writing of the following:
a. The basis of the proposed separation.
b. What type of separation could result,
[e.g., to the Reserves or out of the Corps].
c. The least favorable characterization of service authorized for the pro-
posed separation.
d. The member's right to consult with counsel.
e. The right to obtain copies of documents that support separation.
f. The right to request a board hearing.
g. The right to present written statements to the separation authority in lieu
of a hearing.
h. The right to available military counsel at the board hearing.
i. The right to retain civilian counsel at the member's own expense.j. The right to appear in person before the board.
k. The right to make sworn or unsworn statements before the board.
I. The right to challenge voting board members for cause only.
m. The right to examine evidence presented by the board, cross-examine
witnesses appearing before the board, submit evidence and make final
argument.
n. The right to waive the above rights.6"
Conspicuously absent from this laundry list of rights is the abso-
lute right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.70 The
68. DoD Directive, supra note 6; 32 C.F.R. § 41 et seq (1983).
69. Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual para. 6304.
70. The Presiding Officer of the discharge board decides whether to invite wit-
nesses to appear before the board, after considering the following criteria:
The Convening Authority may authorize expenditure of funds for production
of witnesses only if the presiding officer . . . determines that:
(a) The testimony of a witness is not cumulative;
(b) The personal appearance of the witness is essential to a fair determination
on the issues of separation or characterization;
(c) Written or recorded testimony will not accomplish adequately the same
objective;
(d) The need for live testimony is substantial, material, and necessary for a
proper disposition of the case; and
(e) The significance of the personal appearance of the witness, when balanced
against the practical difficulties in producing the witness [e.g. cost and delay],
favors production of the witness.
32 C.F.R. § 41.6, App. A, Part 3(c)(5)(c) (1983). There appear several difficulties with
this scheme. First, having the Presiding Officer of the discharge board decide who to call
is analogous to having the foreman of a jury trial deciding which witnesses should be
produced. Second, it is unlike the jury foreman making the decision in that the jury
foreman is less likely subject to command influence than is the ranking officer of a board
(see infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text). Third, it appears that the use of the
conjunction "and" after part (d) requires that all five of these provisions be met before a
witness is produced. The practical effect of this rule is to provide five ways for the rank-
ing officer not to grant a witness request. Lastly, the ranking officer decides what is
"essential to a fair determination" part (b), what is "necessary for a proper disposition of
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servicemember may only cross-examine those witnesses that appear
before the board; the board has no subpoena power.7 1 Also, the rules
of evidence do not apply to board hearings.7 2 Objections by counsel
are noted for the record, but not ruled upon.7 3 Without these addi-
tional safeguards, a servicemember may be issued a damaging other-
than-honorable discharge on the basis of written hearsay statements
submitted by someone the servicemember may not subpoena to the
board hearing to cross-examine. 74
The Need for Confrontation and Cross-Examination
When the discharge is honorable and carries no stigma or deroga-
tory connotation, it may be validly accomplished without a noticed
hearing.75 Courts, however, will not permit the imposition of a
stigma on servicemembers in connection with their discharges from
military service without affording them due process. 6 A discharge
effected in violation of statute, or in violation of the military's own
regulations and directives, is a violation of due process. Such dis-
charges are void.77 Because of the potential for harm to the ser-
vicemember, the Claims Court will not sustain an undesirable dis-
charge unless the applicable regulations were "honored in letter and
spirit."78 Unless and until the regulations fully guarantee the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the regulations, even
though "honored in letter and spirit," nevertheless seem insufficient
and unfair.
In criminal proceedings, the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses is a fundamental right, guaranteed by the constitu-
the case" (d), and what is the "significance of the personal appearance of the witness"
(e), without hearing or seeing the evidence he is excluding. This seems illogical as well as
unfair to the potential dischargee.
71. 32 C.F.R. § 730.15 (b) (1983). However, the situation with a formal court-
martial is different. The court-martial system provides "the trial counsel, the defense
counsel, and the court-martial . . . equal opportunity to obtain witnesses . . . ." 10
U.S.C. § 846 (1982). Compulsory process is "similar to that which courts of the United
States having criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue . . . ." Id.
72. 32 C.F.R. § 41.6, App. A, Part 3(c)(5)(e) (1983).
73. 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(d)(2) (1983).
74. Crowe v. Clifford, 455 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1972).
75. Keef v. United States, 185 Ct. CL. 454, 467-68 (1968).
76. "Id. See also Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (where
plaintiff never had the chance to confront the witnesses against her or even to know the
charges, hearing was a meaningless formality).
77. Cason v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 424, 436 (1973); Keef v. United States,
185 Ct. CL. 454, 460-61 (1968); Middleton v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 36, 40 (1965).
78. Glidden v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 515, 517 (1968) (quoting Conn v. United
States, 376 F.2d 878, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
tion, and deemed essential to a fair trial." No person can be pun-
ished without first being convicted of a crime by proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt following a trial at which a host of procedural and
substantive rights are guaranteed.80
In many ways an other-than-honorable discharge proceeding is
like a criminal proceeding. Servicemembers may be discharged on
the basis of acts that are crimes in the civilian justice system,81 after
a board finding that they did the act alleged in the discharge no-
tice.82 A characterization of "other-than-honorable" implies a moral
judgment about the person affected that is similar to the moral judg-
ments implied by criminal sanctions.83 The punitive effects of other-
than-honorable discharges have been discussed above.84 It is there-
fore proper to argue that servicemembers should be afforded the ba-
sic rights of those tried in civilian criminal proceedings or their mili-
tary equivalent, courts-martial. The rights of confrontation and
cross-examination are included in a person's due process rights. They
are no less important than the rights to reasonable notice of the
charges against that person, and an opportunity to be heard in one's
defense. These rights are part of an entire package of rights that
comprise a citizen's right to his day in court.85 These rights are as
essential as one's right to counsel, a right which is granted by the
regulations.8 In Greene v. McElroy,87 the Supreme Court stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individ-
ual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evi-
79. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). The Court also stated: "There are
few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which
is this country's constitutional goal." Id. at 405.
80. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
81. 32 C.F.R. § 730.12(b) (1983), for example, provides for the discharge of a
servicemember, by reason of unfitness, if his military record reflects the use or possession
of narcotics or other illicit drugs.
82. The members of a discharge board appear to be assigned the task of acting like
a criminal jury resolving whether a civil burden of proof has been met. To confirm the
accuracy of this anology in the following regulation, where the regulations state "recom-
mendations," read "sentence" and where they state "Notice," read "complaint:"
(1) The Board shall determine its findings and recommendations in closed ses-
sion. Only voting members of the Board shall be present.
(2) The Board shall tletermine whether each allegation set forth in the notice of
proposed separation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
(3) The Board shall then determine ... whether the findings warrant separa-
tion with respect to the reason for separation set forth in the Notice.
32 C.F.R. § 41.6, App A, Part 3(c)(5)(g) (1983).
83. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.10 (1979) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
84. See supra notds 53-67 and accompanying text.
85. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
86. Id. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
87. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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dence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individ-
ual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is
important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more important
where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory
might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by
malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We have formal-
ized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amend-
ment which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This Court has
been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only
in criminal cases, but also in all types of cases where administrative and
regulatory actions were under scrutiny.88
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Williams v. Zuckert,8 9 stated that
the requirements of due process provided by the fifth amendment
should protect a civil servant facing discharge "by giving him the
same right to confront his accusers as he would have in a criminal
trial."90
In reviewing administrative hearings, the primary concern of the
courts has been to guarantee a full disclosure of charges and adverse
statements with the identification of the sources, so the accused may
effectively prepare and conduct an adequate defense.91 One may ask,
however, whether one who has been denied access to information or
deprived of the privilege of cross-examination is in a position to
make an offer of proof on such matters. Further, a reviewing court
cannot know what a full hearing might have shown and for that rea-
son seems incapable of speculating accurately as to the prejudice in-
volved in case of an erroneous ruling. 92 "Because the type of dis-
charge may significantly influence the individual's civilian rights and
eligibility for benefits provided by law, it is essential that all perti-
nent factors be considered so that the type of discharge will reflect
accurately the nature of service rendered . . . ." According the in-
dividual the right to confront and cross-examine all adverse wit-
nesses would help ensure a fair consideration of all the pertinent fac-
tors relative to the discharge, in accordance with the regulations'
requirement that the board proceedings "should be formalized to the
extent of assuring full opportunity for presentation of the respon-
88. Id. at 496-97 (citations omitted).
89. 371 U.S. 531 (1963).
90. Id. at 534 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. Grimm v. Brown, 291 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 1968), afj'd, 449 F.2d
654 (9th Cir. 1971).
92. Powhatan Mining Co. v. Ickes, 118 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1941).
93. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 583 (1958) (quoting Army Regulation 615-
630, para. 7).
dent's case."94
Professor Wigmore, commenting on the importance of cross-exam-
ination, states:
For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of Evi-
dence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination as a
vital feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard for testing the value of
human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross- examination,
and the conviction that no statement (unless by special exception) should be
used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has
found increasing strength in lengthening experience.95
Some courts have applied the principles stated in Greene to void
discharges granted without affording the accused the right of con-
frontation and cross-examination.9 6 The court of appeal in Bland v.
Connally97 invalidated a discharge given a naval reservist, because
he was not permitted to confront adverse witnesses. The court found
Bland was entitled to have any future administrative proceedings
against him conducted with this procedural safeguard.98 Because of
the potential for injustice and the punitive effect of other-than-hon-
orable discharges, justice requires servicemembers should be granted
the absolute right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Command Influence
A tougher problem to solve than lack of opportunity to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses is the pervasive problem of
command influence in the discharge process. The administrative dis-
94. 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(d)(2) (1983). Construing this provision, the court in Cason
v. United States, 471 F.2d 1225 (Ct. Cl. 1973) held that where the Board failed to have
the servicemember's accusers appear at the hearing, although they were on active duty in
the local area, and relied on an unattested, allegedly inaccurate transcription of a tape
recording made by one of the uncalled witnesses, despite the servicemember's demand
that the complete tape be produced, the Board departed from 32 C.F.R. § 730.15 (see
supra note 20) by ignoring the intent thereof to ensure a fair hearing and the specific
prescription quoted above, which includes the opportunity of the accused to test the au-
thenticity of incriminating evidence. Accordingly, the servicemember's discharge was
nullified.
95. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (citing Bishop v.
Copp, 96 Conn. 571, 114 A. 682 (1921)).
96. See, e.g., Clackum v. United States, supra note 76; but cf. Unglesby v.
Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (failure to provide compulsory process to
insure the physical presence of witnesses whose statements were considered by adminis-
trative tribunal did not cdnstitute such denial of due process or of opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses as would render success on appeal likely, where petitioner
was well aware of evidence that would be presented and did not request such witnesses to
appear voluntarily nor seek to obtain additional statements from them); Crowe v. Clif-
ford, 455 F.2d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1972) (federal constitutional provisions requiring con-
frontation of witnesses and federal court rulings strictly limiting the admissibility of
hearsay evidence goverriing criminal trials held not applicable to administrative dis-
charge hearings from Army).
97. 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
98. Id. at 860.
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charge process is "a system that is based on command discretion."9
Command influence is an abuse of that discretion. It is difficult to
detect or protect against within the existing discharge process. Ulti-
mate responsibility for the successful accomplishment of his assigned
military mission rests with the military commander. He is an execu-
tive in a competitive organization. Advancement and desirable as-
signments depend on how well he achieves the mission. Therefore, he
desires to rid his command of poor performers and members who,
through their misconduct, may discredit his command.100 In pursuit
of this objective, the commander may unintentionally, or otherwise,
influence the discharge process to produce the results he desires.
When this occurs, the board becomes merely a superficial bow to the
servicemembers' due process rights.
There is danger of potential abuse in the process. The commander
appoints the members of the discharge board.10' The members are
often within the commander's sphere of influence and may even be
in his direct chain of command.'0 2 The commander may be responsi-
ble for writing some of the members' performance evaluations, upon
which advancing and obtaining desirable assignments depend. The
commander also appoints the "recorder," who is basically counsel for
the government. The recorder presents the government's case and
ensures that a record is made of the hearing.0 3
The discharge board quickly realizes that the commander is not
apt to have appointed the board to see to it that the accused is re-
tained in the service. This realization may color the board's decision
to approve or disapprove the accused's witness requests,0 and influ-
ence the board's decision to separate or retain the servicemember.
Perhaps out of a feeling of loyalty and respect for the commander,
the board may be persuaded to come to a decision to separate, with-
99. 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(a) (1983).
100. See supra note 41.
101. 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(a) (1983).
102. In Cole v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 178 (1965), the court held that where a
major general having authority over the officers comprising the Board of Inquiry ap-
peared before that Board, required the officer under charges and his counsel to leave the
room, briefed the members regarding their duty to rid the service of undesirable or ineffi-
cient officers without indulging in "undue compassion" and without becoming "confused
by technicalities or tactics" which might be employed by the accused or his counsel,
there had been the sort of "command interference" which deprived the accused officer of
his constitutional right to a fair hearing under the due process provision of the fifth
amendment. See generally, Everett, Military Administrative Discharges - The Pendu-
lum Swings, 1966 DUKE L.J. 41.
103. 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(a) (1983).
104. See supra note 94.
out sufficient detached regard to the facts of the case. Such thinking
would be similar to a jury believing the accused in a criminal trial is
guilty because why else would the police arrest him and the prosecu-
tor bring him before a court?
Improper command influence would clearly be a violation of the
accused's right to a fair hearing. 05 But serious proof problems (and,
perhaps, fear of reprisal) prevent dischargees from charging com-
manders with command influence. In the absence of an overt act,
such as the commander lecturing the discharge board on its duty to
rid the service of undesirable personnel, command influence is diffi-
cult to prove. Presuming command influence automatically, merely
because the members of the board are within the commander's
sphere of influence or chain of command, cannot be supported. The
way out of the dilemma is to refer all other-than-honorable dis-
charge cases, with minor exceptions,10 6 to courts-martial. A court-
martial provides the accused with the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses in a forum armed with subpoena
power,10 7 and the danger of command influence is lessened where the
proceedings are in the hands of military counsel and judges outside
the commander's sphere of influence.10 8
Servicemembers committing significant acts of misconduct should
be sent to a court-martial, the proper forum for punishment. 09 A
special court-martial may grant a bad conduct discharge and a gen-
eral court-martial may impose either a bad conduct or dishonorable
discharge."10 The punitive effect of the bad conduct discharge is not
markedly different from that of an other-than-honorable dis-
105. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Cole v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 178 (1965).
106. It would appear useful to retain the other-than-honorable discharge, accepted
in lieu of trial by court-martial, as a plea-bargaining device. NAVMILPERSMAN,
supra note 16, § 3630650. This device allows the dischargee to admit guilt to a charge of
misconduct (punishable by a punitive discharge) and saves all parties the administrative
burden of a court-martial.
107. Article 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1982). Re-
fusal to appear or testify is a punishable offense under Article 47, 10 U.S.C. § 847
(1982). Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) makes improper
command influence a punishable offense.
108. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1982); Kasey v. Goodwyn, 291 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 959 (1962). "No person . . . may attempt to coerce, or by any
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribu-
nal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case . . . ." 10
U.S.C. § 837(a) (1982). A similar provision prohibits the use of performance evaluations
for influencing or evaluating the performance of duty of members and counsel of a court-
martial 10 U.S.C. § 837(b) (1982). The language of section (a) is susceptible of exten-
sion into the administrative discharge system, as it prohibits influencing "any other mili-
tary tribunal or any member thereof. . . ." The author is unaware of any cases making
such an extension. The conduct such as that of the major general in Cole v. United
States, 171 Ct. Cl. 178 (1965), described supra note 101, seems an easy target for this
section.
109. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
110. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(d),(e) (1983).
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charge.11' The major difference between the two discharges is in the
amount and quality of due process afforded the potential dischargee.
If the servicemember's misconduct would not support imposition
of a bad conduct discharge in a court-martial, then the member
should be processed for an honorable or general discharge, which the
commander can do without providing a noticed hearing." 2 This rec-
ommendation accommodates both the commander's interest in
quickly removing inefficient, misbehaving members from his com-
mand, and the servicemember's interest in due process protection
against a damaging stigma. 13
CONCLUSION
In Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,"4 the
Supreme Court stated: "[C]onsideration of what procedures due pro-
cess may require under any given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government func-
tion involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action." 1 5 Two basic equities must be considered in
thus analyzing military discharge procedure. The first is the need of
the armed forces for a system that provides for the swift separation
of individuals who have demonstrated their incompatibility with mil-
itary service, or whose continued association is inconsistent with the
needs of the service. The second is the requirement that any such
system must afford fair treatment to the individual and must include
procedural safeguards which adequately protect his rights."'
The individual's private interest is in being free from the stigma of
a derogatorily characterized discharge. A risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of that interest exists because the present procedures lack the
absolute right of confrontation and cross-examination, and because
the system is pervaded by the threat of command influence. Courts
have been reluctant to impose additional due process requirements
on the military out of deference to the traditional policy of non-inter-
ference in military affairs."' This Comment has considered the mili-
I 11. See supra note 53.
112. See supra note 29.
113. The question then, however, becomes whether a general discharge would take
on the pejorative connotations associated with the other-than-honorable discharge. See
supra note 39.
114. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
115. Id. at 895.
116. 1971 Hearings, supra note 50, at 5929.
117. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
tary as one of the largest employers in America, with a special mili-
tary mission: the preparedness for, and the fighting of, wars.118
When the government's interest is in summary dismissal of unsuita-
ble employees who burden the military service and impede the mili-
tary mission, the government's ability to do so is not questioned. 119
But when the government punishes a servicemember with an unde-
sirable discharge characterization meted out through a summary ad-
ministrative proceeding, the individual's interest in avoiding an un-
fair, damaging adjudication requires greater protection than that
currently afforded by administrative regulations. 20 Other-than-hon-
orable discharge candidates should be guaranteed the absolute right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses in administrative
discharge proceedings. Alternatively, because of the risk of erroneous
and unfair punishment of dischargees, the process of imposing unde-
sirable discharges should be taken out of the commander's adminis-
trative reach, and placed in the more careful, deliberate, and just
hands of the court-martial system's military judges and counsel. This
approach recognizes the other-than-honorable characterization for
what it truly is - a punitive measure.' 21
Administrative discharges should not be used as a summary means
of punishing servicemembers by circumventing the stricter require-
ments of due process before punishment mandated by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the Constitution. 122
118. "[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguard-
ing essential liberties." Home Bldg.& Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934).
In Arnheiter v. Ignatius, 292 F. Supp 911, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1968) the court stated that it
is not for a federal court to substitute its judgment for that of the military in internal
administrative matters involving command judgment concerning duty assignments and
promotions under war conditions. It is not the duty of the courts to run the army. See
supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text. It is, however, the duty of the courts to ensure
that the administrative discharge process deals fairly and constitutionally with discharg-
ees. See supra notes 20, 90, and 93, and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
120. As stated supra at note 20, the contours of due process in the military com-
munity are far from clear. However, as the Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough, and suffi-
ciently adaptable, to protect soldiers - as well as civilians - from the crude
injustices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing guilt by dispens-
ing with rudimentary fairness rather than finding truth through adherence to
those basic guarantees which have long been recognized and honored by the
military courts as well as the civil courts.
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1953).
121. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
122. "So long as an administrative discharge is not used as a summary guise for
punitive action, [citation omitted], . . . the military remains within legally proper bounds
when it chooses to grant an honorable discharge for the Government's convenience." Birt
v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 910 (1967). See Comment, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 839,
850-55 (discussion of use of NJP to circumvent the jurisdictional limits of courts-mar-
tial); see supra notes 80 and 120 and accompanying text.
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Our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply be-
cause they have doffed their civilian clothes.
23
CHARLES P. SANDEL
123. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 188
(1962).
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